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Abstract 
The New Zealand public sector has gone through major refonn as a result of fiscal deficit in 
1984 (KettI, 1997; Schwartz, 1997), resulting in shift of emphasis from quality service 
provision to establishing financial supremacy (Kettl, 1997). This raises concern as to how 
public sector employees are attaining balance between their service objectives with financial 
ones and how is the ethics negotiated in this process. Following this concern, this paper 
focuses on detennining the organisational variables consisting of organisational policies in the 
Disbict Health Boards (DHBs) and hospitals of New Zealand on ethical behaviours of 
managers and the ethical climate of these departments. 
The aim of this study is to increase our understanding of the ethical climate of the public 
health. Our findings suggest that little emphasis has been provided to the aspect of ethics in 
New Zealand health sector. There is no reward for employees who exhibit exemplary ethical 
behaviour, no hot line to consult/report about ethics, any detailed guidelines and policies, and 
not enough ethics-related training provided to staff. 
Introduction 
The New Zealand public sector has gone through major refonn following fiscal deficit in 
1984 (KettI, 1997; Schwartz, 1997). The aim of this reform was to exercise control without 
bearing the risk of ownership (Gill, 2001). This led to the import of business-like principles of 
plivate sector into public sector through the administration of contracts (Boston, 1996, 1998; 
Hood, 1998). Contracts have been used to measure the perfonnance of public sector Chief 
Executives (CEs) in mainly quantitative and financial tenns (Boston, 1996). Each 
Govemment department and their respective CEs are now required to achieve outputs, though 
whether and how outputs can be linked with outcomes is still a question to be resolved 
(Laegrid, 2000). The only rationale behind attaching stress on outputs rather than outcomes is 
due to the fact that outputs can be easily measured while measUling outcomes are difficult 
(Mascerenhas, 2001). The stress in now on attaining fiscal targets and to justify the survival 
of public sector entities through publishing financial statements on the same basis as that of 
private sector, that is, accrual accounting and through the preparation of annual report 
following the enactment of Public Finance Act, 1989 to ensure that public sector entities 
confonn to the budgets, which acts as meeting the accountability requirements. However, in 
this reporting paradigm there is no requirement from departments to establish that they are 
meeting the service and/or product requirements of citizens of the country, which is the main 
purpose of the existence of a public sector (Ketti, 1997). The Cave Creek incident in New 
Zealand further emphasises the fact that the quality of public sector departments in tenns of 
fulfilling the requirements of the society is insufficient (Hood, 1998) and raises concern in 
regard to whether the present stress on financial achievement of public sector is having a 
reverse effect on fulfilling the requirements of New Zealand citizens. 
A concern arising from the shift of the existence of public sector to fulfil the requirements of 
citizens to achieve outputs is the way this new requirements are dealt in everyday life by 
public sector employees. Hence, how public sector employees attain balance between their 
service objective with financial objectives and how this mechanism of balance affects their 
ethics is a question that raises serious question these days especially in New Zealand. This 
concern has led the present paper to explore the ethical climate of New Zealand public sector, 
by taking the case of New Zealand Health sector. 
Literature Review 
The refonn of New Zealand public sector has attracted the attention of a large number of 
researchers. These studies can be grouped into three categories for the purpose of this paper 
as: studies investigating the reform and its underlying causes, studies investigating the 
contributing factors that led to fast paced refonn and studies providing critical analysis of the 
refonn process. 
(i) Studies investigating the New Zealand public sector reform and its underlying causes 
The principal reason behind the reorganisation of institutional and ideological structure in 
Australia, New Zealand, Denmark and Sweden was to overcome fiscal deficits (Schwartz, 
1994). Schwartz (1994) states that the requirement to shift policy in New Zealand public 
sector came in early 1984. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand tried to obtain loans from 
overseas to sustain its foreign currency reserves but international banks refused such requests 
that shocked the Treasury and the Reserve Bank. The New Zealand refonn started from this 
fiscal crisis gradually reorganising the public sector. In New Zealand attention was given to 
effectively spend money in the public sector as government expenditure was a significant 
share of national expenditure (Evan, 1993). 
Another reason behind New Zealand public sector reform was its poor perfonnance in 1970s 
and 1980s that forced many countries including New Zealand to change their public 
management systems (Campos and Pradhan, 1997). Campos and Pradhan (1997) opine that 
countries such as Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom (U.K.) started experimenting 
with various alternative approaches to improve the perfonnance of public sector. The New 
Zealand refonn aimed at attaining fiscal discipline and enhancing technical efficiency and the 
principle motivations guiding this refonn were transparency and accountability. Transparency 
and accountability mechanisms forces politicians and bureaucrats to confonn to the rules due 
to the fact that these mechanisms impose implicit costs of violating such rules. Transparency 
has been laid down in New Zealand public sector through specification of outputs in CEs' 
contracts; appropriations taking outputs purchased by the Government as the basis; 
requirement to prepare and publish financial statement, such as Balance Sheets showing net 
worth of government and legislatively enforced frequent disclosure of perfonnance 
infonnation. On the other hand, enforcement of accountability took place through employing 
agency heads on tenure basis as compared to permanent positions before; proper specification 
of outputs expected from organisations and through the administration of implicit and explicit 
employment contracts for agency heads and their employees together with the requirements to 
publish accounts and calTY on audits of such accounts. The emphasis in New Zealand has 
been mainly on technical efficiency rather than strategic priority setting, resulting in emphasis 
provided to technical efficiency in the delivery of outputs, such as, goods and services 
produced in New Zealand instead of an emphasis to attain outcomes (impact of outputs). The 
public sector refonn in New Zealand originated from an over-expended public sector. Hence, 
the emphasis during the refonn process has been the reduction in role of the state following 
large-scale privatisation. The theory guiding the refonn was the principal-agent theory. 
The principles underlying the New Zealand public sector refonn has been introduction of 
market and competition in this sector; segregation of policy-making function from regulatory 
ones and service provision; implementation of accountability within public bodies to senior 
managers and finally to a democratically elected body(ies); implementation of a planning 
process that includes objectives, plans and actions that would facilitate monitoring and 
evaluating the achievement of government programmes; establishing clear lines of democratic 
accountability; introduction ofunifonn accounting systems with the application of accmal 
accounting (Wistrich, 1992). The public sector refonn in New Zealand encompassed strategic 
management, accounting, economics, policy analysis, public policy, public management, 
public choice and law (Stewart and Stewart, 2004). 
The refonn stressed on efficient management of services through the introduction of systems 
designed to provide freedom from political intervention to managers, while setting politically 
detennined objectives at the policy level and establishing transparent reporting procedures. 
Ministers detennine policy objectives and they are accountable to the Parliament for 
'outcomes,' that is, for attaining intended objectives, while CEs are responsible to attain 
'outputs' as efficiently as possible (Wistrich, 1 992b). 
The fiscal deficit in New Zealand has led to redesigning, reorganising or reconfiguration of 
New Zealand public sector (Boston and Pallot, 1997) which can be tenned as New Public 
Management (NPM) (Wallis and Dollery, 2002). Under the changed approach, the 
Government specifies a limited number of principally desired results for the public service as 
a whole over a period of three years. These are known as "strategic result areas" (SRAs) 
(p.383). More specific targets, known as Key result areas (KRAs) are fonnulated by taking 
SRAs as the basis for CEs of government departments (Boston and Pallot, 1997). 
KettI (1997) states the public sector refonn in New Zealand has been guided by principal-
agent theory. Refonners in New Zealand replaced authority and rigidity with flexibility 
together with introducing market-style competition. The adaptation of this theory resulted in 
the introduction of various fonns of organisation, such as, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
government departments, local government and crown entities including schools, tertiary 
education institutions, research institutes and health sector organisations. The rationale for 
such introduction of various organisational forms was differences in activities to be achieved 
(Hay, 2001). 
The refonn that started from the Labour Government in 1984 resulted in commercialisation, 
corporatisation and privatisation. The aim of the Crown behind corporatisation and 
commercialisation of entities was to retain ownership without bearing risk. The refonn also 
initiated outsourcing (Gill, 2001). This refonn resulted in a shift of emphasise from inputs 
towards outputs and outcomes. Planning and implementation functions were separated 
following private sector model. Monopolies over provision of services were mostly 
eliminated with the introduction of competitive tendering. The State Owned Enterprises 
(SOE) Act, 1986, the State Sector Act of 1988 and the Public Finance Act of 1989 changed 
the status of managers within state agencies and enterprises regarding labour relations. The 
State Sector Act of 1988 and the Public Finance Act of 1989 impacted on labour discipline 
that fonnerly existed in the traditional welfare state and non-commercial agencies. The State 
Sector Act of 1988 changed the wage structure of public sector aligning it with private sector 
resulting in erosion of centrally detennined wages. The Act provided the managers of public 
sector agencies and SOEs the right to hire and fire employees and to fonnulate their 
employees' remuneration. On the other hand, these managers were now under contract with 
the Treasury and Ministers to produce certain outputs, that is, goods and/or services. The state 
completed the construction of market mechanism for public services taking user-pays 
principals as the basis at all levels. Agencies with high rates of return and low costs for 
services are rewarded with more resources through bigger contracts compared to agencies 
with low rates of return (Schwaliz 1994). 
Funnell (2004) states that the economic necessity resulting from budget deficit in the 1970s, 
forced the governments of West minister countries, such as, Australia, New Zealand and 
England to bring refonn to their public sector. The aim of the refonn was to ensure that 
taxpayers were getting value for their money through the imposition of more accountability 
requirements on government departments and agencies regarding their perfonnance. During 
this time extensive refonn to management was calTied out in the public sector that included 
clearly set objectives for programs and departments and eventually to the introduction of 
value-for-money auditing. The author states that public sector management reforms in the last 
two decades of the 20th century in Westminister countries has resulted in the convergence of 
former rigid divide between public and private sector. Some private sector practices were 
perceived to be appropriate to the public sector during the reform process at the level of 
policy fonnulation and program management. The auditor-general of these Westminister 
countries are now required to comment on management efficiency a tenn fonnerly used in 
private sector, which was not expected before the management refonn in the public sector in 
these countries. 
The key motivation behind public sector refonn in New Zealand stemmed from fiscal crisis 
(Meehan, 1996). The author states that the New Zealand government in 1984 believed that the 
introduction of competition in public sector was the only way of improving the fiscal 
condition of the country. The principles guiding the refonn were transparency and 
consistency. Ministers believed that 'transparency' will eradicate unnecessary functions, 
develop efficient processes and clarify accountability. The ideas of transparency and 
consistency were arranged into organising principles to guide the refonn process. These 
principles include, the state should not be involved with those activities that can be efficiently 
and effectively perfonned by the private sector or the community; efficiency and 
effectiveness of trading enterprises can be improved if they are stmctured along the lines of 
private sector and separation between policy and operational functions together with 
separating commercial and non-commercial activities in government departments will 
facilitate in bringing more efficiency and effectiveness of their operation. 
The gradual adaptation of business- like principles in public sector went to the extent of 
participating in 'Business Excellence Awards' administered by the New Zealand Business 
Excellence Foundation in 2002 by public sector entities, such as, Trade New Zealand, ACC 
Healthwise business units and Auckland Regional Council (ARC) (Birchfield, 2002). 
The refonn and hence stress on financial achievement has led to the extensive use of 
contracting (Boston, 1996) following the pattern of private sector. The principle reason 
behind such introduction of 'contracts' was to enhance accountability, by enhancing 
transparency between politicians and senior public servants, as contracts clearly specifies the 
responsibilities of public servants and hence provides a clear picture of responsibilities of 
politicians as well (Hood, 1998). Boston (1996) states that these contracts are used in both 
outsourcing of public sector activities to private sector as well as between public sector 
organisations. Such contracts include agreements in regard to funding, purchases and 
perfonnance. The rigour of contracts in New Zealand public sector has been emphasised by 
Schick (1998). The author titled this era as 'Government by contract' (p.124). The contractual 
mechanism encompassed relationships between the government and Ministers with suppliers 
of such goods and services. Each year several contracts are negotiated fonnally. Each contract 
specifies the resource that should be supplied by one side and the perfonnance the other side 
will be expected to produce. Ministers are on the resource supplying side and CEs can either 
be on resource providing side or the goods or services providing side, depending on their role. 
The perfonnance agreements between CEs and Ministers took the place of the old civil 
service ethic of trust and accountability. It has also led to restructuring of departments and the 
separation of policymaking functions from the delivery of goods and/or services. One such 
example is, the national defence organisation, which was divided into the Ministry of Defence 
and Defence Forces. The Ministry of Defence plays the policy advisory role to the 
government, whereas the Defence Forces CatTY out its assigned operations. 
Schick (1998) explained the role of contracts in New Zealand public sector. The author 
suggests that the present system, at the time of placing the budget in Parliament, publishes a 
departmental forecast report that specifies outputs to be produced in the next financial year. 
The forecast report provides the basis to conshllct purchase agreements which are prepared 
before the start of the year between the CE and the Minister purchasing the goods and/or 
services. The purchase agreements contain the outputs in details. At the end of the year, each 
department publishes an Annual Report containing outputs actually produced, facilitating the 
government to determine whether the tenns of various contracts have been fulfilled. 
Laegrid (2000) suggests that the key motivation behind introducing contracts in New Zealand 
public sector was to enhance efficiency of this sector. The contracts led to an introduction of 
annual performance agreements between Ministers and CEs together with an annual system of 
assessing perfonnance and perfonnance linked remuneration. 
The concern arising from the studies discussed above is how does attaining economic and 
efficient operation with ethical operation matches. The focus throughout the public sector 
refonn has been overcoming fiscal deficit through attaining technical efficiency (Campos and 
Pradhan, 1997). This led to the introduction of market mechanism in the public sector 
(Wistrich, 1992; KettI, 1997, Gill, 2001). The market mechanism has been based on user-pays 
concept. Agencies with high rates of return and low costs are provided with bigger contracts 
(Schwartz, 1994) The auditor-general of New Zealand has to comment on management 
efficiency in New Zealand (Funnell, 2004). This system has led to an emphasis on outputs 
rather than outcomes. At the end of each year departments report their outputs, which act as 
the basis of measuring their efficiency. In this system where efficiency, economy and 
effectiveness together with competition is given priority in the public sector in line with the 
private sector, without any/much emphasise on 'ethics,' it raises concern as to how this 
balance is maintained or it is a pure gamble allowed to be played in this era of cutting cost. 
(ii) Studies investigating the reason behind fast-pacing of New Zealand public sector reform 
Ketti (1997) states that the public sector throughout the world has gone through a stage of 
revolution from 1970s through to mid-1990s. New Zealand followed large-scale forceful 
changes in its public sector. The factors that aided such fast paced refonn is the smallness of 
the country and its straightforward political system. Similarly, Quiggin (1998) suggest that the 
fast-paced New Zealand public sector refonn was facilitated by unitary state of unicameral 
Parliament which provided the fonner Finance Minister, Roger Douglas to take an 
authoritarian approach. One such example where authoritarian approach was definitely 
applied was the implementation of Goods and Service Tax (GST) in which case its 
unpopularity did not deter its implementation. The Labour government, possessing the 
majority in a unicameral Parliament did not need national consensus at the time of imposing 
the GST. 
The forceful and rapid changes in New Zealand were facilitated by the fact that the country 
was ruled centrally by a single party. The New Zealand had a centralised system, with the 
core executive, the New Zealand Ministry of Finance and State Service Commission (SSC), 
possessing the capability to impose administrative change throughout the rest of the public 
sector administrative system, including the local government (Pollitt and Summa, 1997). 
It is evident from the above studies that the fast-paced refonu in New Zealand was facilitated 
by its smallness, straightforward political system and unitary state of unicameral parliament 
(KettI, 1997; Quiggin, 1998), which led to authoritarian approach of imposing New Public 
Management (NPM) in the New Zealand public sector, rather than a democratic one. This 
further confinus the concern in regard to whether significant attention was provided to ethics 
in the public sector. 
(iii) Studies providing a critical analysis of the reform 
Boston and Pallot (1997) opine following their study that their respondents suggested that the 
present model involving SRAs and KRAs may not be achieving its intended purpose as SRAs 
and KRAs were not clearly defined. 
Boston (1996) criticises the use of contracting in the public sector. The main criticism rests on 
the fact that all such contracts are not negotiated on an anus-length basis and agents are often 
forced to accept the tenus provided by the principal. Similarly, Schick (1998) opines that the 
over emphasis on contractual mechanism is detrimental to the public sector as this system has 
reduced traditional values of public service, personal responsibility and professionalism. 
These contracts have led to a checklist approach to accountability by managers. Finally, these 
contracts are hypothetically between public entities, one being the owner and the other being 
the owned. The establishment of this market mechanism is at best psudo market as there is no 
real market. Hence, the government weakly addressed the un-satisfactory perfonuance of its 
own organisations. The author states that there may be some benefits in adapting market 
mechanism in the public sector, but anything less than the real one, such as the non-existence 
of real market, deters the government to obtain full benefits of vigorous competition. 
Laegrid (2000) suggests that contracts have led to the introduction of too specific 
responsibilities and expectations on employment relations at senior level in the public sector, 
which may be detrimental to this sector. This is due to the fact that at the senior level 
flexibility and duty should be given priority as opposed to job specification. 
Mascarenhas (1996) suggests that the economic crisis of 1970s in New Zealand changed the 
concentration of management in government from accuracy, honesty, equity and reliability to 
efficiency in line with the private sector. The author criticises the present public sector 
efficiency measures as they are based on quantitative terms. Also perfonnance measurement 
in different public sector organisations should follow different criteria as public sector entities 
are not a homogenous group and every organisations are different from each other. The author 
also suggests that there is greater emphasise provided on outputs rather than outcomes as 
relating outputs and outcomes is difficult in some sectors, such as, in health, education and 
social welfare (Mascarenhas, 1996). Another question resulting from a distinction between 
'outcomes' and 'outputs' is whether the government intended to purchase specific goods and 
services from its departments to attain its outcomes. The principle reason of the government 
to own departments is to fulfil its social and economic objectives, so that it reflects the values 
and ethos of good government and fulfils requirements of public accountability, rather than to 
purchase goods and services (Meehan, 1996). Similarly, Preston (1999) opines that the aim 
for smaller government in New Zealand from the reduction in public sector leads to doubt as 
to whether the government exists to meet the public interest and welfare of the community 
and hence raises doubt in regard to the values driving the government. 
Another problem resulting from the New Zealand public sector reform focussed on outputs as 
opined by Mabin, King, Menzie and Joyce (2001) is departments are working within 
constraints of a budget, and hence may not be able to deliver all desired strategic outcomes. 
As a result, departments are finding it essential to attach priorities among activities, both in 
terms of their relative contribution to outcomes as well as for allocation of scarce resources. 
The authors state that prioritisation among activities lead to difficulties. The introduction of 
any system to prioritise resource allocation can lead to feelings of anxiety among those who 
may perceive that they will incur loss in the new order. These feelings are expected to find 
expression in resistance to the process of priority-setting. 
Nonnan and GregolY (2003) criticises the present accountability mechanism of public sector. 
The authors state that the public sector refonns in New Zealand has not recognised challenges 
and complexity resulting from variations in tasks of public sector entities and narrowed the 
tasks of public sector staff to defined tasks and to fulfil accountabilities taking those defined 
tasks as the basis, which shows that the refonn has failed to recognise principal motivators 
that used to stimulate public sector staff before. 
It is evident from the studies mentioned above that the emphasise on fiscal targets were so 
high that it led to suppression of agent by the principal and hence the forceful implementation 
of contract tenns on the agent (Boston, 1996). The contractual mechanism is detrimental to 
public service as it reduces the core values of public service (Schick, 1998). The rigour for 
attaining technical efficiency has led to specification of duties and responsibilities at the 
senior level, which is likely to provide less motivation to these managers to go out of their 
duties to serve the society (Laegrid, 2000) as these managers are not measured by those extra 
effolts, as these efforts are outside the checklist. This led to measuring perfonnance in 
quantitative tenns (Mascarenhas, 2001), which again is likely to adversely affect the 
motivation of public sector employees to serve the society. However, the principal concern 
rests on the fact that whether the government at all intended to purchase these outputs 
measured in quantitative tenns at the very outset as the government exists to serve the society 
rather than attaining outputs (Meehan, 1996). This focus on outputs have led to the 
prioritisation of resources to meet the target budget (Mabin, Menzie and Joyce, 2001) which 
is expected to affect the ethical climate of the public sector, as this is expected to motivate 
public sector to meet the budget rather than considering the needs of the society. 
The Health Sector 
The change process was so aimed at fast pacing that during the public sector reform some of 
the refonlls were not clearly mapped and implemented even before a specified future 
direction was provided to the concerned sector. One such example is the health sector reform, 
which was restructured three times in 1990s. This refonll has also introduced contracting in 
health sector similar to other public sector entities. 
Newberry and Barnett (2001) provide an analysis of the contracting process of New Zealand 
mental health services. There were 28 agencies providing mental health services at that time, 
spread across four purchasing authorities, that is, Regional Health Authorities (RHAs), who 
used to purchase services from their respective agencies. These RHAs were funded by the 
government. All agencies realised that their funding and hence operation if not existence itself 
now depended on purchasing of their services by their respective RHA. Taking this 
advantage of vulnerable position of agencies, most of these RHAs forcefully negotiated 
contracts with their agencies at low costs, and hence exploited them. More than 15 out of 28 
agencies provided services to their RHAs at a cost more than the prices they used to get from 
their RHA. The reason behind this financial pressure imposed on these agencies by RHAs 
was to adhere to their funding agreement with the Minister of Health and hence to establish 
their supremacy in financial terms. RHAs that spent less amount compared to others for 
similar services were considered to be more efficient. The quality of service provision of 
agencies under respective RHAs was not considered to evaluate the efficiency of RHAs. The 
only representative of efficiency was financial perfonllance. 
The third restructuring of the health sector was carried out after the general election in 
November 1999. Gauld (2003) states that one of the principle reasons behind this 
restructuring was to reduce competition within the health system. This restructuring, has led 
to abolishing New Zealand Health Funding Authority (HF A) and its functions and staff 
members were re-designated to the Ministry of Health (MOH) same as that existed after the 
first refonll in 1993 and 21 new District Health Boards (DHBs). The responsibility of 
assessing health needs and planning and health care purchasing was attributed to these DHBs. 
The implementation of this change process started before the development of any details of 
this process. The legislation enabling this change process was not passed until December, 
2000, which was almost after one year from the commencement of such change process. 
Hence, those involved in the change process had to make plans without being guided by any 
future direction. 
Doolin (2003) provides a case study of the refonn process of a New Zealand hospital between 
1994 and 2001. The Health and Disability Services Act 1993 transfonned New Zealand health 
providers into commercial entities. The main ideology of such transformation at the 
government level was economic rationalism, leading to introduction of managerialism into the 
health sector. The health sector was previously dominated by health care professionals, which 
now gave way to an accountant taking the position of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at 
the end of 1995. This new CEO adapted a different approach to management of the hospital 
due to pressure from the central government to reduce operating deficits. As a result, the 
production line became the central theme for healthcare management among the hospital's 
managers. Following this concept, clinical care was translated into patient flow management 
and hence production line management. The attribution of clinical specialities as semi-
autonomous business units made clinical managers accountable for both the clinical and the 
financial performance of their units that included clinical outputs and cost management. 
However, the concept of clinical leadership changed in 2001. Management became totally 
separated from medicine. Clinicians opposed the attempt to involve medical practice into 
management. This led to larger groupings of clinical specialists replacing clinical units, and 
clinical directors were working alongside operations and service managers. 
The reform process significantly affected the health sector in New Zealand, which can be 
named as a gambling sector or gambling with life of orgaisations that are supposed to save 
human life. This is due to the fact that the fast-paced refonn has restructured the health sector 
thrice, with the first restructuring more focussed on attaining fiscal targets and competition 
while the third restructuring targeted to reduce competition, though not overlooking the 
financial aspect. During the first reform the focus on fiscal target was so high that efficiency 
was judged by taking the amount spent by Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) as a yard 
stick. The Health and Disability Sector Act 2003 changed New Zealand Health providers into 
commercial entities, which were guided by economic rationalism (Doolin, 2003). Clinical 
leadership was replaced by managerial leadership during this time (Doolin, 2003). 
This fast-paced refonn in the health sector that introduced market-mechanism has motivated 
the present study to explore the ethical climate of New Zealand health sector. The principle 
concern arising from this fact is the extent to which balance is achieved between attaining 
financial targets and ethical discipline in New Zealand health sector and hence to explore the 
ethical climate of this sector. 
Ethics in Public Sector - Previous Studies 
Studies investigating the aspect of ethics in the public sector are sparse. These studies can be 
provided as follows: 
Ashkanasy, Falkus and Callan (2000) conducted a study of ethical attitudes of public sector 
employees in Australia. The data was collected from public sector organisations of one 
Australian state. The authors states that demographic variables (gender, managerial level and 
job tenure) and personal ethical values together with contextual (conflict between personal 
values and work demands, relevance of a fonnal code of conduct as perceived by individuals 
and perceived requirement for a formal code of conduct) and group-level variables (extent of 
use of code of conduct by an individual's work group) were related to dependent variables, 
that is, use of code or ethical tolerance while organisation's reward scheme had no such 
relation. The authors state that the extent to which others in the group used the code was 
related to individuals' use of such codes. On the other hand, ethical tolerance was mainly 
related to personal values in regard to the leniency with which they viewed unethical 
behaviour and the extent to which these individuals viewed such unethical behaviour to be 
trivial. The authors' state their finding that propensity to use fonnal codes was a contributing 
factor for the use of these codes by others in the organisation, rather than the application of 
the specific requirements within the code, is interesting. This suggests that the notion of a 
fonnal ethical code is not an aggregation of specific ethical requirements. Rather, it may be 
that ethical attitudes are holistic in nature, and that an ethical moral climate in an organisation 
is a product of a set of carefully crafted and detailed codes. The author concludes that the use 
of a code in an organisation is a self-perpetuating activity. It depends on the use by increasing 
number of people in a given organisation. If more people use them it is more likely that other 
individuals will also use the code. 
Haynes and Jones (1999) suggest that the principle concerns while developing a code of 
ethics in the public sector results from balancing demands of two contesting nature, that is, 
ethical values on one hand and corporate managerialist framework which uses performance 
indicators on the other hand. The authors suggest that contestability, philosophical integrity, 
performance indicators and whistleblowers protection are key elements that need to be 
considered in developing a code of ethics in business-like public sector entities, such as those 
in Australia. Whistleblowers protection has been emphasised by De Maria (1995) as well. De 
Maria (1995) proposes protection of whistle blowers in the present arena of public sector 
ethics movement. The author conducted a survey of ex-Queensland public sector employees 
who raised their voice against wrongdoings in the 1990-93 periods. In this study a whistle 
blower was a concerned citizen, motivated by public interest, who disclosed a significant 
wrong action of their organisation to a person or agency at a status capable of investigating 
the complaint and advice correction of these wrong actions. The author states that some of 
these whistle blowers received punishment from their boss for speaking out, which took form 
by following policies and procedure so that the organisation is not charged with illegality, 
such as, selective redundancy and poor performance review. Some of them also faced 
unofficial revenges, such as exclusion from various social activities. There were no policies or 
procedures to stop exclusions in these organisations and hence it could be easily carried on 
against these whistleblowers. The principle motivations behind reprisal mechanisms against 
these whistleblowers were to make their working environment so intolerable that they were 
forced to resign. The author suggests from this survey that the public sector ethics movement 
should consider the protection of these whistle blowers. This is due to the fact that these 
whistle blowers bring wrong doings to the light of justice. 
Whistle blowers' protection has also been emphasised by Preston (1995). Preston (1995) 
suggests that in this era when public sector ethics are gaining significant attention in 
Australia, concerns are increasing for legitimate whistleblowers as they may be forcefully 
made silent in this new public sector culture. This is due to the hierarchical structure of the 
public sector which is undemocratic and involves moral authoritarianism, which may lead to 
"ethical renewal" (p.5) rather than "structural renewal" (p.5). 
James (2003) considered the application of 'economic rationalism' in public administration 
and its impacts on the ethics of public sector decisions. The author argues that the 
introduction of' economic rationalism' seems to fit well with a utilitarian view of ethics where 
'public interest' is served with creating government savings. However, 'economic 
rationalism' fits less well with deontological view of public interest. This is due to the fact 
that under this view the motivation to attain common good, as distinct from personal interest 
has less recognition in the economic rationalist paradigm. 
Harris (1999) discusses the impact of placing public sector employees in contracts similar to 
private sector ones on their ethics as these employees can now be disposed off without a 
reason or prospect for appeal. The author states that the public sector should be careful in 
adopting private sector management accounting principles and practices as students in public 
schools and patients in hospitals are not customers, their treatment by public service cannot be 
equated with private sector treatments, as public sector does not exist only for profit. 
Similarly, it is expected that government employees will follow a higher ethical standards 
compared to private sector employees, which is now at risk in the public sector. The author 
concludes that the public sector used to provide significant benefits to its employees and 
hence these employees were not required to act unethically or unprofessionally. At present 
such benefits do not exist as public sector service principles have been replaced by 
pragmatism and ethics have been replaced by outcomes. The author advises a betterment of 
this scenario in the public sector. 
A similar opinion to Harris (1999) has been provided by Gregory and Hicks (1999). Gregory 
and Hicks (1999) states that in New Zealand public sector has depended on mechanistic 
interpretation of public organisation as opposed to the organic one. A mechanistic approach 
focuses on organisational accountability as opposed to responsibility and hence may be 
counterproductive over the long term in maintaining high standard of ethics. The authors 
advise the development of a concept of responsible accountability to minimise this possibility. 
The concept of accountability encompasses controllability or answerability of public officials, 
while responsibility encompasses their obligations and trustworthiness. The mechanistic 
~pproach is concemed to enhance the periodic measurability of results and perfonnance, 
while the organic one encompasses qualitative assessments, sound judgement and critical 
analysis of perfonnance through continuing process of public scrutiny. Following of a nalTOW 
idea of accountability, as opposed to securing and maintaining responsible behaviour by 
public officials may lead to longer-term damage to public institutions, though may be fruitful 
in the ShOli term. The authors suggest that a balance needs to be achieved between these two 
forms of administrative reform, to make sure that changes do not take place at a cost of 
lowering the ethical standard in public service, and hence the idea of responsible 
accountability will serve the purpose better. The authors state that mechanistic and organic 
paradigms provide different perspectives to the nature of control in public organisations. 
These two approaches have been used to ensure high ethical standards in public service, 
encompassing compliance-based or systematic means based in traditional bureaucratic 
hierarchy and integrity, or trust-based approach which focus on character, integrity and 
trustworthiness of organisation members. The former approach is impersonal while the later 
one is humanistic and forms a part of organic paradigm. The authors state that the 
introduction of New Public Management (NPM) in the New Zealand public sector starting 
from mid-1980s has shifted the balance from a procedurally oriented bureaucratic system to a 
results-oriented managerial one, leding to more reliance on public servants in regard to their 
ethical competence rather than decreasing such reliance. The authors opine that ethical 
probity may be under threat under this new regime ofNPM. The authors suggest that ethical 
probity is enhanced by risk-taking and tolerance for mistakes rather than stressing on 
compliance with procedures to avoid undesirable results, like that imposed in the new NPM 
regime. The imposition of 'managerial ism , in line with the private sector to the public sector 
as that has been done in New Zealand may threaten ethical probity in public sector as lower 
incentives are provided in business entities to stop personal conuption. The authors advice the 
appreciation of organic interpretation of public administration rather than the nalTOW 
mechanistic interpretation. Otherwise high standards of honesty, integrity and fai111ess in 
public sector gove111ance in countries such as New Zealand may be at risk. 
The conce111 in regard to how a balance can be attained between ethical values on one hand 
and attaining performance indicators on the other hand has been questioned by Haynes and 
Jones (1999). However emphasise on attaining economic targets does not necessarily degrade 
the ethical climate in the New Zealand public sector and especially the health sector. Hence 
the aim of the present study is to explore the ethical climate in New Zealand health sector. 
Structure of New Zealand Public Health Sector 
The New Zealand health sector has gone through major refonns in the last decade from more 
market-based approach in 1993to a community focussed sector introduced later on 
(www.moh.govt.nz). 
There are 21 District Health Boards (DHBs) in New Zealand that existed from 1st January, 
2001. These DHBs are responsible for providing and/or funding of health and disability 
services in their districts. These DHBs are funded by the Ministry of Health (MOH) which 
provides policy advice, regulation, funding and monitoring the agencies. These DHBs are 
guided by two strategic documents, that is, New Zealand Health Strategy and New Zealand 
Disability Strategy (www.moh.govt.nz). 
The Present Study 
The present study adopts Morris, Schindehutte, Walton and Allen (2002) to explore the 
ethical climate of the New Zealand public health sector. These authors used the environmental 
approach which posits that particular aspects within the organizational environment, such as 
the reward system, peer influence, codes of conduct, role models and organizational nonns 
and values, have a demonstrable effect on the ethical behaviour of individuals. This study 
uses the second part of Morris et a1 (2002) survey to explore the impact of ethical climate 
variables on employee perceptions regarding what is ethically acceptable within the 
organization, the importance of ethics within the organization, the sense that ethical standards 
are clear-cut, and the level of satisfaction with the ethical climate of the organization. 
The purpose of the present study is to empirically examine the relationship between adequacy 
of ethical standards and policies of these depmtments and the managers' preparedness to deal 
with ethical challenges as they arise. 
Research Methods 
The questionnaire has been developed based on the ethical context of entrepreneurship study 
by Morris et a1 (2002). They designed a self-report questionnaire in two separate instruments, 
one assessed personality traits of the entrepreneur, key business descriptors and the stage of 
business development and the other measured the ethical climate of the firms and employees' 
perceptions regarding ethical nonns and behaviours within the firms. Morris's second 
instrument has been adopted for this study and considered to be relevant to the present study 
as the concerns are more-or-1ess the same in the public sector and especially the health sector 
in this era when market-like mechanism has been introduced in this sector. However, the 
questionnaire has been slightly changed to suit the health sector to some extent, in which case 
the study by De Maria (1995) and Preston (1995) have been taken into consideration, as these 
two later studies encompassed public sector. 
To measure the ethical development framework, a series of dichotomous (yes/no) questions 
was asked. The respondents were asked about the person in the organization with direct 
responsibility for ethics-related issues and the amount of ethics related training in their 
organization. 
The ethical perceptions and norms were measured through different approaches, three 
questions used to assess importance of ethics within the firm, one question about the 
organization's philosophy and a series of seven ethical dilemmas about the clarity of the 
ethical guidelines and policies and the same ethical dilemmas about their rate of occurrence in 
the organization. 
Sample 
The sample consists ofDHBs and hospitals in North Island of New Zealand. This consists of 
15 DHBs and 34 hospitals. Before distributing the questionnaires an email were sent to all 
DHBs whether they are agree to participate or not. Three DHBs sent email back and 
expressed their disagreement to participate in this study. As a result, questionnaires were not 
distributed to these three DHBS and hospitals attached to them. Therefore the final the 
number of organizations surveyed was limited to 12 DHBs and 27 Hospitals. The survey 
questionnaires were sent to an employee holding managerial position in each DHB. 
Questionnaire was also sent to one employee holding managerial position together with ten 
employees holding clinical position in each hospital. This totalled to 12 managers ofDHBs, 
27 employees at managerial level and 270 employees holding clinical positions in hospitals, 
resulting in a total sample of 12 in DHBs and 297 in hospitals. 
A total of 66 surveys were returned, of which 3 responses from DHBs and 63 responses from 
hospitals. Thus, the response rate for DHBs is 25% and for hospitals is 21.2%, and for the 
total population is 21.4%. As the questionnaire was sent by mail, the completion and return of 
the questionnaire was taken to be consent. There was no separate consent fonn to be 
completed by the participants. Filling in the questionnaire implied informed consent. This 
response rate would appear acceptable for this study as the similar research of this type had 
the same rate of responses (Monis et aI, 2002, 28.4%). 
Instrument Design 
Measurement of the organizational policies involved a series of twelve dichotomous (yes/no) 
questions regarding the presence or absence of each of the twelve elements cited in Monis 
study. In addition to these questions, participants were asked to indicate the person in the 
organization who has direct responsibility for ethics related issues and the amount of ethics-
related training done at the organization, (none, some or a great deal). 
The ethical perceptions and norms were asked through multiple approaches. First, a set of 3 
items from Victor and Cullen's (1987) ethical climate survey (cited by Morris et aI, 2002) was 
used to assess the importance of ethics within the organization, where a 5-point (strongly 
agree - strongly disagree) response scale was employed. This was followed by a question 
about the best statement that will define their organization's philosophy. 
Second, seven ethical dilemmas from Morris et al (2002) was used to ask the respondents 
about the level of clarity of the organizations' ethical guidelines and policies for dealing with 
each situation (very clear and specific guidelines, general guidelines, or no real guidelines) 
and the level of the occurrence of the ethical dilemmas in their organization (regular 
occurrence, frequent occurrence, or never happens). This was followed by a question about 
the occurrence of a serious ethics-related problem of respondents. 
Third, the respondents indicated the global rating of the organization's overall preparation for 
dealing with any ethical challenge that comes along on a 5-point (very well prepared - not at 
all prepared) likert scale. 
Fourth, the respondents evaluated how clear the organization's ethical guidelines are on a 5-
point (extremely clear - no ethical guidelines) likert_scale. 
Finally, three measures of satisfaction with the organization's management of ethical issues 
were included, with the respondent providing a rating on a 5-point (strongly agree - strongly 
disagree) likert scale. 
Analysis 
Preliminary and exploratory tests employing Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 
14 was used to analyze the data and to generate frequencies and other descriptive statistics. 
The independent T-Test was used to detennine statistically significant differences between 
the managers and doctors. Measurement of the organization policies involved a series of 
twelve dichotomous (yes/no) questions. The first 7 questions asked for the presence or 
absence of a fonnal statement of core value, penalties for unethical behaviour, rewards for 
ethical behaviour, a fonnal mission statement, a hot line, a fonnal code of conduct, and a code 
of conduct that provides guidance about resolution of ethical dilemmas on their job. We also 
asked them whether they are aware of the organization's effort about communication of 
ethical stories with other employees, ethics-related training as an on-going activity, access to 
the policies' manual, the manual clarity and if some one is responsible for ethics-related 
issues. The results are reported in Table I. 
Table I 
Measurement of Organization Policy* 
Managers Doctors 
A formal statement of core values 100 97 
Penalties for unethical behavior that are 66 73 
communicated to all employees 
Rewards for employees who exhibit 14 7 
exemplary ethical behavior 
A fonna1 mission statement that covers 45 65 
ethical issues 
An anonymous hot line (telephone, e-mail) to 7 13 
seek advice on ethical issues and/or report 
ethical abuses 
A fOl1lla1 code of conduct 90 90 
A code of conduct that provides guidance to 46 40 
employees about the resolution of ethical 
dilemmas they may face on the job 
Does your organisation make unique effort to 28 13 
communicate stories about employees who 
went out of their way to do the ethical or 
right thing with other employees of the 
organisation? 
Is ethics-related training an on-going activity 28 19 
at your organisation? 
Does each employee of your organisation 100 94 
receive, or have access to, a manual of the 
organisation's policies? 
Does the manual explicitly cover ethical 45 50 
issues? 
Does someone in your organisation have 50 54 
direct responsibility for ethics-related issues? 
* As a percentage of the respondents. 
The doctors and managers highly agreed to the existence of formal statement of core values, a 
fOl1llal code of conduct, and access to a manual of the organization's policies. On the 
contrary, substantial difference was observed between managers and doctors about a formal 
mission statement that covers ethical issues. In particular, 45% of managers agreed to the 
existence of a fOl1lla1 mission statement against 65% of doctors. 
Table I shows that, the least popular are the rewards for exemplary ethical behaviour, an 
anonymous hot line, communicating stories with the other employees and ethics training in 
the organization. On average, doctors believe more in absence of these guidelines except an 
anonymous hotline that managers are. 
Respondents were also asked about the amount of ethics-related training done at the 
organization (none, some or a great deal). 68.2% of respondents indicated none or very little 
ethics training while 31.8% believed some ethics training and none believes a great deal of 
ethics training is done in the organization. In line with the previous question about the ethics-
related training within the organization, all respondents (managers and doctors) indicated that 
there are very little or none ethics related training available to employees in public health. 
Second, seven ethical dilemmas outlined in Monis et al (2002) were adapted to ask the 
respondents about the level of clarity of the organization's ethical guidelines and policies for 
dealing with each unethical situation (very clear and specific guidelines, general guidelines, or 
no real guidelines) and the level of the OCCUlTence of the ethical dilemmas in their 
organization (regular occunence, frequent occunence, or never happens). The results are 
reported in Table II (a) & (b). 
Table II (a) and Table II (b) shows that the doctors and managers had the same opinions in 
regard to the clarity of ethical guidelines to respond unethical scenarios and the level of 
occunence of unethical situations except in the level of occunence of 'inappropriate use of a 
power position by a senior manager in dealing with a subordinate' and that managers believe 
this situation is a regular to a frequent OCCUlTence but the doctors believe it is a frequent to 
never happens. 
Table II (a) 
Independent Samples T -Test -clarity of the organization's ethical guidelines and 
policies for dealing with each unethical situation 
Managerial Non-Managerial-Doctors 
Std. Std. 
Factors N Mean Deviation N Mean Deviation i-value 
Clarity Inappropriate use of 
Power 30 l.90 .71 32 l.97 .86 t (60) = -.341, P = -.341 
Using organisation's 
resources 30 l.43 .57 32 l.72 .68 t (60) = -l.782, P = .080 
Overstating expenses 30 l.33 .55 32 l.41 .56 t (60) = -.518, P = .606 
Taking credit 30 2.67 .48 32 2.38 .79 t (60) = 1.738, P = .087 
Promising a service 30 2.20 .76 32 2.13 .79 t (60) = .379, P = .706 
Sharing private, 
confidential information 30 1.40 .68 32 l.41 .80 t (60) = -.033, P = .974 
Copying computer 
software 30 l.53 .82 32 1.34 .70 t (60) = .981, P = .330 
Table II (b) 
Independent Samples T -Test - the occurrence ofthe ethical dilemmas in the organization 
Managerial Non-Managerial-Doctors 
Std. Std. 
Factors N Mean Deviation N Mean Deviation t-values 
Occurance Inappropriate use of Power 
30 1.57 1.14 32 2.16 .85 t (60) = -2.306, P = .025 
Using organisation's resources 
30 1.40 1.00 32 1.72 .92 t (60) = -1.302, P = .198 
Overstating expenses 
30 2.00 1.20 32 2.13 1.16 t (60) = -.417, P = .678 
Taking credit 
30 1.63 1.13 32 1.84 .99 t (60) = -.782, P = .437 
Promising a service 
30 1.90 1.09 32 1.81 .90 t (60) = .346, P = .731 
Sharing private, confidential 
information 30 1.67 1.12 32 2.16 1.08 t (60) = -1.748, P = .086 
Copying computer software 
30 2.07 1.23 32 2.16 1.14 t (60) = -.298, P = .767 
Table III 
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N Mean Deviation t-values 
32 2.91 1.146 t (60) = -.359, P = .721 
32 2.56 1.105 t (60) = -l.079, P = .285 
32 3.53 1.367 t(60)=.112,p=.911 
Finally, three measures of satisfaction with the organization's management of ethical issues 
were included, with the respondent providing a rating on a 5-point (strongly agree - strongly 
disagree) response scale. Table III shows the mean responses and t-values resulting from 
independent samples t-test. This test was used to see if there are any significant differences in 
the responses between doctors and managers about three measures of satisfaction with 
organization's management of ethical issues. 
Results reported in Table III indicate that there is no statistically significant difference 
between managers and doctors for all three measures of satisfaction with the organization's 
management of ethical issues. 
Conclusions 
This study investigates the use of ethical guidelines and policies in the public health by 
managers and doctors in the New Zealand. 
We find that: 
• There is agreement between managers and doctors in regard to the existence of a 
fonnal statement of core values, a fonnal code of conduct, and access to a manual of 
the organization's policies. 
• Managers and doctors have different opinion in regard to the existence/non-existence 
of a formal mission statement that covers ethical issues. Doctors agreed relatively 
more on a fonnal mission statement. 
• Managers that confirm the absence of the rewards for exemplary ethical behaviour, 
unique efforts are made to communicate stories about employees who went out of 
their way to do the right thing and ethics training in the organization are more than 
doctors. 
• Doctors that confinn the absence of an anonymous hot line to seek advice on ethical 
issues and/or report ethical abuses are more than managers. 
• Managers and doctors show very similar opinion as very little or none ethics related 
training available to employees in the New Zealand public health. 
• Managers and doctors had the same opinions in what they regarded as the clarity of 
ethical guidelines to respond unethical scenarios. 
It Managers and doctors are different over the inappropriate use of a power position by 
a senior manager in dealing with a subordinate that managers believe this situation is 
a regular to a frequent occurrence but the doctors believe it is a frequent to never 
happens. 
• Managers and doctors had the same degree of satisfactions with the organization's 
management of ethical issues. 
Our study suggests that little emphasis has been provided to the aspect of 'ethics' in New 
Zealand public health sector. Perhaps it has been lost under the realm of 'economy' and 
'efficiency' and left to a gamble allowed to be played with these two Es (economy and 
efficiencyLThere are no rewards for employees who exhibit exemplary ethical behaviour, no 
hot line to get help, no detailed guidelines and policies, and not enough ethics-related training 
available for those seeking advice. The existence of a fonnal statement of core values, a 
fonnal code of conduct, and access to a manual of the organization's policies were highly 
supported by managers and doctors. In short, there appears to be a tendency for the public 
health organizations to set a formal code of ethics and core values instead of details 
guidelines, policies, trainings, and hot lines to communicate a climate of ethical decision 
making. 
For scholars, though, this study demonstrates a significant relationship amongst doctors and 
managers about organisational issues in the public health, medical and patient ethics is not 
included. 
Limitations and direction for future research 
The study is limited to New Zealand and in its sample size. Future study is suggested that will 
include larger sample. Also similar research in other countries that have brought New Public 
Management (NPM) in their public sector is suggested so that generalization of our findings 
in context to NPM can be made. 
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